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Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board, as 
the governing body of the Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter "ITD"), now files its 
Reply Brief in support of its cross-appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ITD raises two issues on cross-appeal. The first issue is whether the District Court erred 
in holding that Idaho Code§ 12-117 is the exclusive statutory basis for awarding attorney fees in 
condemnation cases. The second is whether, after finding ITD to be the prevailing party in this 
case, the District Court erred in failing to award reasonable attorney fees to ITD. 
In response to ITD's cross-appeal, Defendant/Appellant HJ Grathol, a California general 
partnership ("Grathol") filed its second brief, Appellant's Reply Brief(hereinafter "Grathol's 
Reply Br."). In its reply brief, Grathol argues that the District Court properly denied ITD's 
request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 because, according to Grathol, the statute is 
"the exclusive basis for awarding attorney's fees in actions involving state entities." Grathol's 
Reply Br. at 36 (citing State, Dep 't ofTransp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87,278 P.3d 957 (2012) 
("Grathol I") (emphasis in original omitted)). Grathol's argument is an incorrect statement of 
Idaho law. 
The proper standard for attorney fee awards in condemnation actions was set forth by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 877-78, 673 P.2d 
1067, 1071-72 (1983) and two subsequent cases, State ex rel. Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 
120 Idaho 825, 829, 820 P.2d 695,699 (1991) and State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 
321-22, 940 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (1997). That standard has not been overturned by the Supreme 
Court nor has it been displaced by the provisions of§ 12-117. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court 
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recently confirmed that the Acarrequi standards control attorney fee awards in condemnation 
cases. See Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 Idaho 981, 992, 303 P.3d 1237, 1248 (2013). 
The Supreme Court also recently confirmed that "section 12-117(1) is not the exclusive 
basis upon which to seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency or political 
subdivision." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 67-68, 305 P.3d 
499, 511-12 (2013) ( emphasis added). As held by the Supreme Court in Syringa, "attorney fees 
may be awarded under any other statute that expressly applies to a state agency or political 
subdivision, such as sections 12-120(3) and 12-121." Id. The Court further held that the 
attorney fee provisions of§§ 12-117, 12-121, and 12-120(3) are all applicable to the State. Id. 
See also Hehr v. City of McCall, 155 Idaho 92, 99-100, 305 P.3d 536, 542-43 (2013) 
(holding that§§ 12-121 and 12-117 are both applicable to attorney fee requests in an inverse 
condemnation case involving a municipality). Thus, contrary to Grathol's assertions, the 
Acarrequi standards, which are based upon§ 12-121, apply to condemnation cases and should 
have been applied by the District Court in this case. 
Grathol has argued that condemnors are not allowed to recover attorney fees in 
condemnation cases. This argument is contrary to the holding in Acarrequi that such awards 
may be made "in the most extreme and unlikely situation[.]" Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878,673 
P .2d at I 072. A review of Grathol' s conduct and abusive tactics throughout this case reflects 
exactly the type of extreme conduct implicitly contemplated by this Court in Acarrequi. The 
many and varied abuses and improper tactics by Grathol are listed in detail, with citations to the 
record, in ITD's first brief, ITD's Brief As Respondent And Opening Brief as Cross-Appellant 
(hereinafter "ITD's Opening Br."), at 74-76. In addition, Grathol's two valuation witnesses, 
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Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood and Alan Johnson, employed many improper valuation methods and 
tactics that initiated a host of battles that never should have been necessary and involved fights 
over issues clearly barred by law or wholly unsupported by the facts in the case. Grathol's 
tactics substantially and unnecessarily increased the attorney fees and costs in this case. The 
improper methods and tactics of Sherwood and Johnson are listed in detail, with citations to the 
record, in ITD's Opening Br., at 76-77. 
Because of Grathol 's abusive tactics, unlawful claims, and improper valuation 
methodologies and abuses, before, during, and after the trial, this case became the epitome of 
extreme conduct, unnecessary and prolonged battles over matters clearly barred by law and fact, 
and consequent needless expenditure of great sums in fees and costs incurred to enforce 
compliance with court orders, the rules of civil procedure, discovery obligations, and to defeat 
unlawful, unsubstantiated, and exorbitant claims for compensation and damages. This is 
precisely the type of "extreme and unlikely" case contemplated by the Court in Acarrequi 
where fees should be awarded to the condernnor. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. 
Based on the foregoing, if this case is not the "exceptional" case where the condernnor 
should recover reasonable attorney fees, as held by the Court in Acarrequi, then there is no 
exceptional case. In that event, landowners will have license to engage in these abuses and 
improper tactics with impunity. The law must provide a remedy under these circumstances. 
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II. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Attorney Fee Awards In Condemnation Cases Are Governed By The 
Standards Announced In Acarrequi And Further Defined In Talbot And 
Jardine. 
In Idaho, the standard for attorney fee awards in condemnation cases differs from the 
standards applied in other civil cases. Telford Lands LLC, 154 Idaho at 992-93, 303 P.3d at 
1248-49. Generally, the award of costs and attorney fees is governed by Idaho Code § 12-121 
and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that attorney fees and costs 
may be awarded to the prevailing party upon a finding that the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. LC.§ 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l), 
54(e)(l). 
By contrast, the award of attorney fees and costs in condemnation cases is governed by 
its own set of rules and applications. The particularized standards were announced in Acarrequi, 
105 Idaho at 877-78, 673 P.2d at 1071-72, and refined in two subsequent cases, Talbot, 120 
Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 699, and Jardine, 130 Idaho at 321-22, 940 P.2d at 1140-41. 
As established in the Acarrequi line of cases, the award of attorney fees and costs in a 
condemnation case involves a two-part analysis: First, a determination must be made as to who 
the prevailing party is under Rule 54( d)(l )(B) and the guidelines established in Acarrequi. 
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71; Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 699; 
and Jardine, 130 Idaho at 320-21, 940 P.2d at 1139-40. Second, once the prevailing party has 
been determined, the amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded shall be determined based 
on the provisions of Rules 54(d)(l) and 54(e)(3). 
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Grathol does not contest or raise any issue on appeal challenging the District Court's 
determination that ITD was the prevailing party in the case. Grathol's sole argument on ITD's 
cross-appeal is that § 12-117 governs the award of attorney fees in this case. As discussed 
below, Grathol's argument is without merit or basis in law. 
B. Attorney Fee Awards In Condemnation Cases Are Not Governed By Idaho 
Code§ 12-117. 
Grathol argues that § 12-11 7 is the exclusive grounds for attorney fee awards in cases 
involving the State and that the District Court properly denied attorney fees to ITD under that 
statute. Grathol's Reply Br. at 43 ( citing Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 
303 P.3d 617 (2013)). Grathol's argument, and correspondingly the District Court's application 
of§ 12-117 to ITD's attorney fee request, is contrary to Idaho law. 
1. Separate Lines Of Idaho Case Law Developed Regarding Attorney 
Fee Awards In Cases Involving State Agencies-One Applicable To 
Condemnation Cases And One Applicable To Other Types Of Cases. 
Contrary to Grathol' s argument that § 12-11 7 applies to the present case, Idaho case law 
provides for separate lines of authority for attorney fee awards in cases involving state 
agencies--one involving the application of§ 12-117 and one involving the application of the 
Acarrequi guidelines in cases involving condemnation actions. 
The evolution of the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code§ 12-117 began 
with Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1966), abrogated in part by Rincover v. State, 
Dept. of Fin., 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1996). In Roe, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
for the first time the interplay between§ 12-117 and the private attorney general doctrine, which 
was based upon§ 12-121. The Supreme Court concluded that§ 12-117, and not the private 
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attorney general doctrine, was the appropriate basis for an award of attorney fees in a case 
against a state agency. Id. at 572-73, 917 P.2d at 406-07. 
The next significant case involving § 12-117 attorney fee awards was State v. Hagerman 
Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 947 P.2d 391 (1997), abrogated by Syringa, 155 Idaho 
at 67, 305 P.3d at 511. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of 
attorney fees against the Idaho Department of Water Resources pursuant to the private attorney 
general doctrine and concluded that§ 12-117 provided the exclusive basis upon which a claimant 
could seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency. Id. at 723, 947 P.2d at 396. The 
application of the statute was later broadened to apply to attorney fee awards both for and against 
the State. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 
1277, 1282 (2010) (holding that§ 12-117 "is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for 
the entities to which it applies.") (citing Hagerman, 130 Idaho at 723, 947 P.2d at 396) 
( additional internal citations omitted). 
During this same period of time, the Idaho Supreme Court was also defining the basis and 
standards for awards of attorney fees in condemnation cases. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877-78, 
673 P.2d at 1071-72 (decided in 1983); Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 699 (decided in 
1991); and Jardine, 130 Idaho at 321-22, 940 P.2d at 1140-41 (1997) (decided in 1997). See 
also State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Fam. Ltd. P 'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 730, 228 P.3d 985, 
997 (2010), overruled in part by Telford, 154 Idaho at 992-93, 303 P.3d at 1248-49. Yet, 
throughout the evolution of the two lines of cases, the Idaho Supreme Court gave no indication 
that the§ 12-117 cases would supplant the Acarrequi principles or that the two standards could 
not co-exist simultaneously. 
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In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has regularly applied both standards. In cases involving 
direct condemnation actions that reached a final determination of just compensation, the Court 
applied the Acarrequi standards, and in cases that did not, it applied either § 12-117 or the 
standard version of§ 12-121, depending in part upon the basis for the attorney fee request. 
Compare City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588, 130 P .3d 1118, 1126 (2006) ( upholding 
trial court's award of fees in direct condemnation action based upon Acarrequi standards and 
granting award of attorney fees on appeal to prevailing parties); Canyon Vista Fam. Ltd., 148 
Idaho at 730-31, 228 P.3d at 997-98 (upholding trial court's award of attorney fees and awarding 
attorney fees on appeal in direct condemnation action based upon Acarrequi standards)1, with 
Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 137 Idaho 777, 782-83, 53 P.3d 828, 833-34 (2002) (denying 
request for attorney fees on appeal made under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 54 on grounds 
that inverse· condemnation claims on appeal were not frivolous or unreasonable); Alpine Village, 
154 Idaho at 939,303 P.3d at 626 (denying request for attorney fees to plaintiff and awarding 
fees to city under§ 12-117 where plaintiff's takings claims were dismissed and had no 
reasonable basis in law or fact). 
A prime example of the Supreme Court's application of the attorney fee standards is 
in the first appeal that was taken in this case. Grathol I, 153 Idaho 87, 278 P.3d 957 (2012). 
The case involved (and still involves) a direct condemnation action. However, the issue on 
appeal was Grathol' s challenge to the District Court's grant of early possession to ITD under 
Idaho Code§ 7-721, and not the final determination of just compensation. On appeal, the Idaho 
1 The Winder case was overruled in part on other grounds in Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 
Idaho 981, 303 P.3d 1237 (2013). 
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Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision but denied ITD's request for attorney fees 
on appeal. Id. at 93, 278 P.3d at 963. 
As noted in ITD's opening brief in the current appeal, the Supreme Court correctly 
applied§ 12-117 to ITD's attorney fee request on Grathol's interlocutory appeal. ITD's Opening 
Br. at 67-68. The Acarrequi factors were not applicable to ITD's attorney fee request because 
(1) the issue presented was a challenge to the District Court's decision granting early possession 
of the Grathol property to ITD and not the broader issue of attorney fee awards at the conclusion 
of a condemnation case; (2) at the time of the appeal, the outcome of the case was unknown and 
the factors necessary for making a determination under the Acarrequi factors had not yet been 
decided in the case; and (3) without a determination of the underlying factors, the Court could 
not have applied the Acarrequi guidelines or made a determination of the propriety of an 
attorney fee award under Acarrequi.2 Moreover, ITD did not request attorney fees on appeal 
under the Acarrequi line of cases because such a request would have been premature. Therefore 
the applicability of the Acarrequi guidelines was not at issue in Grathol I. 
In sum, nothing in the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling on attorney fees in Grathol I 
indicates any intention by the Supreme Court to overrule either the Acarrequi line of cases or the 
entire statutory framework under Title 7, Ch. 7 governing the awards of attorney fees and costs at 
the conclusion of condemnation cases. Accordingly, the Acarrequi standard for attorney fee 
awards remains good law and is to be applied in condemnation actions. 
2 The Acarrequi guidelines for attorney fee awards in condemnation cases include (1) whether 
ITD reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict, 
(2) whether the settlement offer was timely and not made "on the courthouse steps an hour prior to 
trial," and (3) whether the offer was made within a reasonable period after the institution of action. 
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072; Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 699. 
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2. Under Current Idaho Law,§ 12-117 Is Not The Exclusive Basis For 
Attorney Fee Awards In Cases Involving The State, And Attorney 
Fees May Be Awarded Under Any Statute That Expressly Applies 
To A State Agency. 
During the pendency of the current appeal in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the 
applicability of§ 12-117 in cases involving the State or other entities covered by the statutes. 
In the case of Syringa, 155 Idaho at 67,305 P.3d at 511, the Supreme Court overruled its 
decision in Hagerman that Idaho Code§ 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney 
fees in cases involving the State. 3 The Supreme Court concluded that the Hagerman ruling 
regarding the exclusivity of Idaho Code § 12-117 was "incorrect." Id. In Syringa, the Supreme 
Court held that the current state of the law in Idaho is that "attorney fees may be awarded under 
any . .. statute that expressly applies to a state agency or political subdivision," and that "[Idaho 
Code§ 12-117} is not the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award of attorney fees against a 
state agency or political subdivision." Id. ( emphasis added). Among the statutes specifically 
referenced by the Supreme Court as expressly applying to a state agency or political subdivision 
is§ 12-121-which is the statutory basis for the Acarrequi standards. The Supreme Court in 
Syringa then remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the State was 
entitled to an award of attorney fees "under an applicable statute other than 12-117(1)." Id. 
After issuing the Syringa decision in March 2013, the Court issued another decision, 
which again confirmed that attorney fees may be awarded to a state entity pursuant to statutes 
other than Idaho Code§ 12-117. Hehr v. City of McCall, 155 Idaho 92, 99,305 P.3d 536,543 
(2013) (Idaho Code§ 12-117 and§ 12-121 "are expressly applicable" to the city's motion for 
3 Grathol failed to cite, mention, or otherwise attempt to distinguish the Syringa case, despite it 
having been issued nearly four months prior to the date that Grathol submitted its reply brief. 
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attorney fees). 4 The recent decisions regarding§ 12-117 are applicable to the instant case, since 
"[t]he usual rule is that decisions of [the Idaho Supreme Court] apply retroactively to all past 
and pending cases." Athay v. Rich Cnty., 153 Idaho 815,824,291 P.3d 1014, 1023 (2012). 
Moreover, the Court's recent decisions in Syringa and Hehr are not necessarily a pronouncement 
of new law, but rather provide clarification and uniformity to the Court's prior decisions 
regarding attorney fee awards in cases involving the State, including the application of the 
Acarrequi standards in condemnation actions. 
Thus, contrary to Grathol's argument,§ 12-117 is not the exclusive basis for attorney fee 
awards in condemnation actions, and the District Court incorrectly applied § 12-11 7, rather than 
theAcarrequi standards, in denying ITD's motion for attorney fees. 
3. The Cases Cited By Grathol Do Not Support The Conclusion That 
§ 12-117 Applies To ITD's Attorney Fee Request. 
In support of its argument that § 12-117 applies to ITD' s motion for attorney fees in a 
condemnation case, Grathol cites to Grathol I, 153 Idaho 87,278 P.3d 957 (2012); City of 
Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,277 P.3d 353 (2012); Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch. 
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,226 P.3d 1277 (2010); and Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 
154 Idaho 930,303 P.3d 617 (2013). While each of these cases applies§ 12-117 to the 
respective attorney fee requests, none of the cases hold that§ 12-117 applies to attorney fee 
applications at the conclusion of condemnation cases. 
4 Grathol failed to cite, mention, or otherwise attempt to distinguish the Hehr case, despite it 
having been issued weeks before Grathol submitted its reply brief. 
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In Grathol I, ITD did not request attorney fees under Acarrequi-nor could an award of 
attorney fees have been made in the case at the time of the appeal-because no determination 
had been made on the issues required for an analysis of the Acarrequi factors. In Randel and 
Potlatch, while the Supreme Court concluded that§ 12-117 was the exclusive means for 
awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies, neither case addressed the applicability 
of Acarrequi in light of§ 12-117 nor did the cases overrule any of the Acarrequi line of cases 
that have applied the standards over the last 30 years. Randel, 152 Idaho at 910,277 P.3d at 357; 
Potlatch, 148 Idaho at 635,226 P.2d at 1282. 
Similarly, Grathol's reliance on Alpine Village is misplaced. According to Grathol, the 
case supports its argument that Idaho Code § 12-117 applies to condemnation actions. Grathol' s 
Reply Br. at 43. However, Grathol's suggested interpretation of the Alpine Village case is not 
supported by its facts. First, in that case, the City of McCall requested an award of attorney fees 
on appeal, and not as part of the underlying inverse condemnation proceedings before the trial 
court. Id. at 939,303 P.3d at 626. Second, the City did not request a fee award under the 
Acarrequi guidelines, and therefore the issue of whether the Acarrequi guidelines were 
applicable in light of§ 12-11 7 was not presented on appeal. And third, the Court did not 
conclude that§ 12-117 was the exclusive basis for attorney fee awards in condemnation (or 
inverse condemnation) proceedings, nor did it overrule the long-standing rules established in 
Acarrequi, which were re-affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court just six days after the Alpine 
Village case. Telford Lands, 154 Idaho at 992,303 P.3d at 1248 (citingAcarrequi and 
reaffirming that in condemnation cases, "section 12-121 permits the district court in its discretion 
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to award reasonable attorney fees without a finding that the condemnation claim was brought and 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."). 
Grathol makes no effort to explain how Alpine Village is to be read in light of the Telford 
decision. Nor does it offer to explain how its cited cases square with the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Syringa, which holds that "attorney fees may be awarded under any . .. statute that 
expressly applies to a state agency or political subdivision," and that "[Idaho Code§ 12-117] is 
not the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency or 
political subdivision" or Hehr, which concludes that§ 12-117 and§ 12-121 "are expressly 
applicable" to attorney fees requests in cases involving the state or political subdivisions. 
Syringa, 155 Idaho at 67, 305 P.3d at 511; Hehr, 155 Idaho at 99,305 P.3d at 543. In sum, 
Grathol's argument that§ 12-117 applies to condemnation actions is simply contrary to Idaho 
law on attorney fees. 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Recently Reaffirmed The Application Of The 
Acarrequi Standards In Condemnation Cases. 
The continued viability of the Acarrequi standards in condemnation cases was confirmed 
as recently as June 2013 in the case of Telford Lands, 154 Idaho at 992,303 P.3d at 1248. The 
case involved a condemnation action filed by Telford Lands LLC to construct an irrigation 
pipeline across the Cain's property. Id. at 984, 303 P.3d at 1240. Despite being unsuccessful in 
defending against Telford Lands' condemnation claim, the Cains sought an award of attorney 
fees under§§ 7-718 and 12-121. Id. at 992,303 P.3d at 1248. On appeal from the district 
court's denial of the Cains' attorney fee request, the Idaho Supreme Court applied theAcarrequi 
standards to the facts of the condemnation action and upheld the district court's determination 
that the condemnor was the prevailing party and that the condemnees were not entitled to 
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attorney fees. Id. at 992-93, 303 P.3d at 1248-49. The Supreme Court held that "[w]ith respect 
to a condemnation claim, section 12-121 permits the district court in its discretion to award 
reasonable attorney fees to the condemnee without a finding that the condemnation claim was 
brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Id. at 992, 303 P.3d at 
1248 (citingAcarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71).5 
Despite the case having been issued more than a month before Grathol submitted its reply 
brief, Grathol failed to cite or make any mention of the Telford case. Nor did Grathol provide 
any explanation of how the Supreme Court's re-affirmance of the Acarrequi standard as 
governing attorney fee awards in condemnation actions squares with its assertion that§ 12-117 
applies to this case. The simple explanation is that Grathol's argument is wrong. Contrary to 
Grathol's suggestion otherwise, Acarrequi and its standards for attorney fee awards in 
condemnation cases remain good law and apply to this case. 
In its brief, Grathol asserts that during the oral argument on ITD's motion for attorney 
fees and costs, ITD stated that it was not seeking fees under § 12-121 but rather under the 
"particularized rules for costs and attorney's fees that applies to condemnation cases." Grathol's 
Reply Br. at 42 (citing Tr. of Aug. 29, 2012). While Grathol's statement is technically correct, 
its suggestion that ITD is not claiming attorney fees under§ 12-121-as the statute is applied by 
Acarrequi and subsequent cases-is misleading by omission. As discussed above, Acarrequi 
5 Prior to the Telford decision, Idaho Code§ 7-718 was one of the statutory bases-along with 
§ 12-121-for an award of attorney fees in condemnation cases. However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Telford held that § 7-718 provided for the award of costs, not attorney fees, and it 
overruled its decision in Canyon Vista Fam. Ltd. P 'ship, 148 Idaho at 731, 228 P .3d at 998 to the 
extent that it held otherwise. Therefore, after Telford, the bases for awards of attorney fees in 
condemnation cases, as held in A carrequi and subsequent cases, are § 12-121 and Rules 54( d)( 1) 
and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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rejected the traditional application of § 12-121, which imposed the overlay of Rule 54( e)' s 
requirement that fees not be awarded absent a finding of frivolity, unreasonableness, or lack of 
foundation, and replaced it with a new set of rules for attorney fee awards-still based upon 
§ 12-121-but which are specifically tailored to the unique characteristics of condemnation 
cases. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. ITD's statement at the attorney fee 
and cost hearing was intended to make clear that ITD was not seeking fees under the traditional 
application of§ 12-121/Rule 54(e) framework, but rather under the§ 12-121/Acarrequi 
standards. 
D. Attorney Fees May Be Awarded To Condemnors In Exceptional 
Circumstances, Like Those Present In The Current Case. 
Grathol spends much of its argument regarding ITD's attorney fees asserting that there is 
no basis for an award of attorney fees in favor of a condemnor. Grathol's Reply Br. at 37, 40, 
42-50. Grathol's assertions are incorrect, and they ignore the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings to 
the contrary. 
The award of attorney fees in condemnation cases are within the guided discretion of the 
trial court. Jardine, 130 Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139; Telford, 154 Idaho at 922,303 P.3d at 
1248. In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court held that while at the time it could not envision an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor, it left open the possibility for such an award 
"in the most extreme and unlikely situation[.]" Id, 105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. It is 
significant that the Court did not prohibit awards of costs and attorney fees to condemnors, but 
instead limited such awards to exceptional circumstances, such as those that exist in the present 
case. 
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Despite its attempted argument against any possibility of a fee award to condemnors, 
Grathol acknowledges the holding in Acarrequi in its opening brief on appeal and recognizes the 
significance of the holding as to cost and fee awards. Grathol's Opening Br. at 48. Specifically, 
Grathol noted how the Supreme Court in Acarrequi stated that it could not envision an award of 
attorney fees and costs to the condemnors except in the most extreme and unlikely situation. Id. 
Thus, Grathol effectively concedes that the Idaho Supreme Court has not prohibited attorney fee 
awards to condemnors, but rather limits such awards to exceptional cases. 
E. Given The Outrageous Demands And Abusive And Improper Conduct Of 
Grathol Throughout This Case, ITD Should Be Awarded Its Reasonable 
Attorney Fees. 
In this case, Grathol attempts to turn the condemnation of a portion of its property into 
the equivalent of winning the state lottery. Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for 
$1,450,000 in May of 2008. The real estate market then only went down, dramatically, from 
May of 2008 to November 17, 2010, the date of taking in this case. Yet Grathol made demands 
and sought to recover as much as $7,369,500 for the taking of only 16.314 acres (less than a 
third) of the 56.8-acre parcel it bought for $1,450,000. See R. Ex. 156 at 715-16 (Grathol's 
Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Discovery). At trial, after many of its claims 
clearly barred by law had been dismissed, Grathol sought as much as $3,093,360. R. Ex. J at 
962-63 (Just Compensation). 
Grathol's demands for compensation had no support from market data and no connection 
with fair market value. As a result, Grathol resorted to (1) improper appraisal methods; 
(2) claims for damages barred by law; (3) constantly changing the rationale and basis of its 
demands; (4) refusing to provide expert disclosures; and (5) presenting expert opinions that had 
- 15 -
no foundation, no decipherable explanation, and were incapable of independent evaluation or 
verification. 
1. Grathol's Abuses And Improper Conduct Prior To This Appeal. 
In its Opening Brief, ITD provided a detailed list, explanation, and citations to the record 
of the many abuses and repeated instances of improper conduct by Grathol throughout this case. 
See ITD's Opening Br. at 74-79. 
Grathol's misleading, abusive, and improper conduct has continued in its Reply Brief in 
this appeal, as shown below. 
2. Grathol's Arguments Regarding The District Court's Ruling On The 
Larger Parcel Are False And Misleading. 
Grathol repeatedly claims that the District Court ruled that the Larger Parcel imagined by 
its appraiser, Mr. Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, was barred as a matter oflaw. In fact, Sherwood's 
appraisal did not do any Larger Parcel analysis, and made no determination of the Larger Parcel. 
R. Ex. 154 (Sherwood's Restricted Appraisal Report). Sherwood simply appraised 30 acres of 
the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol, id., and then Grathol and its attorneys began referring to those 
30 acres as Sherwood's opinion of the Larger Parcel. 
More importantly, Grathol's claim that the District Court barred Sherwood's Larger 
Parcel determination as a matter of law is an incorrect statement of the District Court's ruling. 
The District Court did not bar Sherwood's opinion as a matter oflaw. It did not even reach the 
issue. The court, as the finder of fact, found Sherwood's opinion to be both unpersuasive and 
contrary to the facts of the case. 
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The decision Grathol has appealed, the Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for 
Judgment ("Post-Trial Mem. Decision & Order for J '') entered May 25, 2012 (R. 1265), clearly 
shows that Grathol's repeated allegations that the District Court barred Sherwood's opinion as a 
matter oflaw are false. Despite repeated motions and showings by ITD that Sherwood's Larger 
Parcel conclusion was barred by law, the District Court refused to make that ruling and allowed 
Sherwood to testify fully about his appraisal, theories, and conclusions. The District Court made 
its decision on Sherwood's Larger Parcel conclusion as a matter of fact. As held by the District 
Court: 
[B]ecause this is a court trial, the Court has not needed to rule as a 
matter of law on the admissibility of Sherwood's larger parcel, 
although ITD has continuously requested such a ruling. 
Assuming Sherwood's methodology is permitted under Idaho law, 
as finder of fact, this court finds that the preponderance of the 
evidence favors finding that the appropriate larger parcel for this 
entire taking, as of the date of taking, is the entire 56.8 acres. The 
history of unity of title, contiguity, and unity of use for the 56.8 
acres, and the evidence of potential future use, supports a common 
sense, logical finding, based upon the factual record, that the 56.8 
acres is one integral unit. Even Grathol 's evidence of future use 
of the 56.8 acres is the same, to wit: commercial development. 
Grathol 's proposed future project plans had design plans, 
admitted into evidence, showing an encroachment into Sherwood's 
"surplus" easterly 26 acres. R. Exs. H (CLC Site Plan) and I 
(Hughes Site Plan). 
R. 1265 at 1280-81 (Post-Trial Mem. Decision & Order for J) (emphasis added). This ruling 
was preceded by several pages of factual analysis of the three components comprising the Larger 
Parcel determination: unity of title, contiguity, and unity of use. Id. at 1277-80. This ruling was 
also preceded by numerous statements by the District Court of the lack of persuasiveness and 
credibility of Sherwood's testimony. See, for example, id. at 127 4 ("Sherwood also testified 
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that he assumed the wastewater system for the particular project Grathol had designed for the 
property would use the easterly 26 acres; however, because Sherwood's whole theory of 
valuation was based upon developing a commercial/retail project on the westerly 30 acres as 
the larger parcel, this Court finds his testimony incomprehensible.") (emphasis added). 
The fact that the District Court's decision on the Larger Parcel was based on the facts, 
and not on a ruling that Sherwood's theory was barred as a matter of law, was reinforced at 
hearings following the trial. As stated by the court: 
And basically the trial went forward in many senses with a 
lot of evidence coming in because the trial court was not clear as to 
just exactly what the facts and the law were going to be, and I felt 
it important to allow the parties to try their theory of the case. 
Tr. ofHrg. on ITD's Mot. for Atty Fees & Costs, at 38 (Aug. 29, 2012). 
Id. at 41. 
Id. at 42. 
[t]here's no survey. Where is this 30 acres? Well, nobody really 
knows. It's the west 30 acres. But, you know, where is it?· 
Where's the line. Well, we don't know because the parcel's never 
existed. 
And when you get into the actual trying to apply it, it just 
doesn't make any sense. I mean, it's just totally unpersuasive. 
You have 30 acres, and Sherwood would subtract different sizes 
from the 30 acres, and sometimes it was - it was always greater 
than 13 acres and less than 14 acres. We just kind of wandered 
about because you just had whatever numbers he was going to 
come up with. 
So by the time I was through listening to Sherwood, the 
admissibility of his evidence was kind of moot because it just flat 
didn't make any sense. And then you combine it with his values -
I mean, the 16 acres [the amount of the taking] was - what? Worth 
more that he paid for the 56.8 acres two years earlier in a period of 
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declining [property values] - it just didn't make any sense. Just 
was not credible or believable. 
So I never really got to the admissibility issue because, 
when you listen to what he had to say, the intellectual framework 
doesn't work, things don't hang together, it's all smoke and 
mirrors, and the values he comes up with didn't have any 
relationship to reality. So, you know, it just wasn't believable. 
Id. at 43 (brackets added). 
In short, Grathol' s repeated allegations in its Reply Brief that the District Court ruled that 
using Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel as the Larger Parcel was barred as a matter oflaw 
is repeatedly refuted by the record and the District Court decision Grathol has appealed. 
Grathol's allegations are false, misrepresent the record, and are designed to mislead this Court. 
For these reasons, Grathol's actions further justify an award of attorney fees to ITD. 
Next, Grathol contends that the District Court was biased against Sherwood's theory or 
preordained its ruling prior to trial. Again, Grathol's argument is false and misrepresents the 
record. As stated by the District Court in its Post-Trial Mem. Decision & Order for J.: 
At the pre-trial Motion in Limine hearing, this Court 
cautioned Grathol that if this were a jury trial, the law was not 
clear as to whether this Court should allow the jury to consider 
Sherwood's methodology, because the highest and best use in this 
case is the same for the entire 56.8 acres. The fact that there is no 
existing Idaho law similar to Wilson would raise this Court's 
concern over allowing a jury to consider Sherwood's 30 acres as 
the larger parcel. It is even more problematic where the basis for 
defining the larger parcel is based not upon a different highest and 
best use, but solely upon a greater dollar value for the hypothetical 
parcel than for the rest of the parent tract. No case law on point 
. has been submitted which this Court has found to address this 
issue. However, because this is a court trial, this Court has not 
needed to rule as a matter of law on the admissibility of 
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Sherwood's larger parcel, although ITD has continuously 
requested such a ruling. 
Id. at 16, R. 1265 at 1280. 
Next, Grathol contends that the District Court ignored Sherwood's "market evidence" 
justifying a 30-acre larger parcel. This, again, is simply false. The District Court noted this 
"evidence" in its decision. Id. at 1274 (Sherwood "testified repeatedly that he used 30 acres 
because he could not find any instances where a commercial/retail development, that was 
comparable to the type of project he believed to be appropriate for the property, had needed more 
than 30 acres."). 
Grathol also wrongly contends that there was no evidence that the Grathol property had 
"unity of use" or "integrated" use. This contention is contrary to all of the factual evidence in 
the case. The only thing to the contrary is the unsupported and "incomprehensible" opinion of 
Sherwood. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
After it purchased the property, Grathol had the entire 56.8-acre property rezoned 
commercial, not just 30 acres. ITD's Opening Br. at 30 (and citations therein). 
No evidence was presented of any plan by Grathol to re-rezone any portion of the 
property. Id. 
All witnesses, except Sherwood, testified that the "highest and best use" of the 
entire property was the same-future commercial development. Id. at 25-28. 
No witness from Grathol's company testified that Grathol would not develop the 
entire 56.8 acres. On the contrary, Grathol, through its part owner Alan Johnson, 
testified that "It's a 100 percent site" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 759: 24), referring to 
the 56.8 acre parcel it had purchased for commercial development and 
immediately rezoned the entire parcel for commercial development. 
Johnson further testified that "We do not, never have, never will, buy a piece of 
property that we do not intend to develop." Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 764:13-14. 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
Sherwood's opinion that commercial developments never exceed 30 acres was 
refuted by Grathol's purchase of 56.8 acres for commercial development. ITD's 
Opening Br. at 20. 
Sherwood's opinion that commercial developments never exceed 30 acres was 
refuted by his own comparable sales that he used in his appraisal, which included 
commercial developments of more than 30 acres. Id. at 20-21. 
Grathol's argument that the property did not have unity of use is refuted by its 
own site plans for the development on its property. Id. at 21-23 and Exhibits 
shown therein. These site plans show development on more than the 30-acre 
parcel created by Sherwood. Id. 
Grathol' s argument that the property did not have unity of use is refuted by 
the fact that the commercial development needs the land east of Sherwood's 
imaginary 30-acre parcel for waste water treatment for the development. Id. 
at 23-24. 
In short, no facts offered either before, during, or after trial supported Grathol's 
contention that the Grathol property did not have unity of use because of and based on 
Sherwood's decision to appraise only 30 acres of the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. 
Next, Grathol overtly misrepresents the testimony of witness Jim Coleman. Grathol 
claims that Coleman testified that a wastewater system for the site plans designed by Grathol 
could be located entirely on the imaginary 30-acre parcel created by Sherwood. Grathol's Reply 
Br. at 26 ("Grathol's engineer, Jim Coleman, who testified that the water treatment systems 
could be located entirely on the western 30 acres and integrated into its development.'). Once 
again, Grathol' s claims are incorrect and contrary to the record in this case. 
To begin with, the District Court ruled that "any kind of testimony from Mr. Coleman 
designed to elicit any kind of inference that somehow this [ wastewater treatment facility and 
required land application of treated wastewater] is something that could go on 30 acres rather 
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than the 56.8 acres is going to be stricken." Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 687:24-25 to 688:1-3. The 
court made this ruling because no such opinion from Coleman was disclosed prior to trial. 
Consequently, Coleman never testified that the entire wastewater treatment facilities and 
the area needed for land application of treated wastewater could be located entirely on the west 
30 acres along with all of the buildings and other infrastructure of the development planned by 
Grathol. See Coleman testimony, at Trial Tr., Vol. IV, at 659-699. Thus, Grathol's statement 
that Coleman testified that all of the wastewater facilities and land application of treated 
wastewater could be located entirely on Sherwood's imaginary 30-acre parcel is false and a 
misrepresentation of the record in this case. 
Moreover, in his actual testimony, Coleman testified that Grathol would need 13 to 16 
acres of land for wastewater treatment and land application of treated wastewater. Id. at 696:21 
to 698:14. Since none of Grathol's site plans for its proposed development showed any land area· 
on the hypothetical western 30-acre parcel for wastewater treatment or land application of treated 
wastewater (let alone half of the 30 acres), Coleman's testimony made clear that wastewater 
treatment facilities and land for disbursement of treated wastewater could not be located on the 
west 30 acres. 
Next, Grathol falsely claims that ITD did not present any evidence that the Grathol 
property had unity of use or that Grathol could not build its planned development exclusively on 
the west 30 acres. This contention is contradicted by Grathol's own site plans that were admitted 
into evidence and cited by the District Court in its decision and that showed Grathol's plans for 
development on more than Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. See ITD's Opening Br. at 
21-23; R. Ex. H (CLC Site Plan) at 954; and Ex.Hat 953 reproduced therein. See also R. 1265 
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at 1280-81 (Post-Trial Mem. Decision & Order for J) (noting site plans developed by Grathol 
showing development on property east of Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel). Grathol's 
contention is also squarely refuted by Grathol's own witness, Jim Coleman, as noted above. 
In addition, ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need from 19 to 25 acres 
for the wastewater treatment system and land application for its treated wastewater, based on 
detailed analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 
726: 11-727: 1. Grathol never planned to develop just 30 acres of its 56.8-acre parcel, and its 
development plans could not be physically located entirely on the west 30 acres. 
Grathol also falsely claims that the District Court rejected evidence that Grathol could not 
proceed with its development without using some or all of the eastern portion of the property. 
Grathol's Reply Br. at 26. In making this claim, Grathol cites to R. 1265 at 1274 (Post-Trial 
Mem. Decision & Order for J ). Grathol takes a few words of the decision out of context and 
then makes this incorrect and misleading argument. In its discussion on that page, the District 
Court notes that Sherwood testified that he used 30 acres in his appraisal because he could not 
find any commercial/retail development that needed more than 30 acres. Id. But, "Sherwood 
also testified that he assumed the wastewater system for the particular project Grathol had 
designed for the property would use the easterly 26 acres[.]" Id In response to this, the court 
noted that "because Sherwood's whole theory of valuation was based upon developing a 
commercial/retail project on the westerly 30 acres as the larger parcel, this Court finds his 
testimony incomprehensible." Id. ( emphasis added). 
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Since Sherwood's appraisal was based entirely on the premise that Grathol's proposed 
development would only need 30 acres, the District Court declared: 
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol's proposed 
project required the easterly 26 acres in order to dispose of waste, 
because Grathol's theory of the larger parcel for this case was 
that it would not need more than the 30 acres to develop its 
commercial/retail project. 
Id. All of the evidence, and Grathol's own site plans, showed that Grathol needed at least half 
of the 26.4 acres east of Sherwood's imaginary 30-acre parcel to build the project it plans. 
Consequently, the District Court's statement above was not a factual finding that the 
development did not need half or more of the east 26.4 acres. On the contrary, the court was 
making it very clear that Sherwood could not claim that the development only needed 30 acres 
or that commercial developments never exceed 30 acres and simultaneously testify that "he 
assumed the wastewater system for the particular project Grathol had designed for the property 
would use the easterly 26 acres[.]" Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the court rejected that 
testimony by Sherwood. Grathol's misuse of the discussion in the court's decision is improper, 
misleading, and in keeping with its conduct throughout this case. 
Next, Grathol cites cases for the proposition that "when there are no claims to severance 
damages to the remainder ( or portions of the remainder), it is reasonable, appropriate and indeed 
mandated that the valuation be based on the economic unit actually impacted by the take." 
Grathol's Reply Br. at 16 (emphasis in original). This argument is incorrect and misleading for 
- 24 -
the following reasons: (1) according to Grathol, it sought severance damages in this case;6 
(2) the language contained in the parenthesis above was inserted by Grathol into its discussion of 
the cases, thereby "creating" the proposition that if no claim for severance damages is made as to 
"portions of the remainder" then the rule of the cases applies; this "addition" or "insertion" into 
the case law is not supported by the cases cited, but rather is a legal creation of Grathol's own 
making; and (3) no witness testified that the 16.314 acres condemned was an "economic unit" 
that could be valued alone. All valuation witnesses except Sherwood valued the 56.8-acre parcel 
owned by Grathol. Sherwood valued an imaginary 30-acre portion of the Grathol property. 
He did not value the take area as a separate "economic unit" which is the predicate for the case 
law cited. 
Lastly, as found throughout Grathol's first brief on appeal, the section of Grathol's Reply 
Brief on the Larger Parcel issue is filled with statements that appear to be statements of law. 
However, the statements are not supported by any citation to legal authority. The section is also 
filled with statements that appear to be principles or standards governing real estate appraisal or 
the real estate appraisal profession, but the statements are not supported by any authority, such as 
the Uniform Standards of Appraisal Practice or any other authority. 
In short, Grathol has continued to abuse the judicial process by misrepresenting facts, 
the testimony of witnesses, and the bases and conclusions of the District Court decision. This 
6 As discussed in section E.3 below, even though Grathol claims that it sought severance 
damages in this case, its expert valuation witness, Sherwood, testified that there was "zero" 
damages. R. 1265 at 1290 (Post-Trial Mem. Decision and Order for J. and Tr. of Hrg. on Mtn. 
for Atty Fees (Aug. 29, 2012) at 47. Additionally, Grathol's part owner testified to damages that 
he characterized as "severance damages" but were actually damages for construction delays, 
which are not recoverable in condemnation actions. See discussion and record citations in 
section E.3, infra. 
- 25 -
further demonstrates that this is the case when attorney fees should be awarded to the condemnor 
as the prevailing party. 
3. Grathol's Arguments Regarding Severance Damages Are Inaccurate 
And Misrepresent The Record. 
Grathol contends that the District Court's determination that the remaining property 
did not suffer any severance damages is not supported by the evidence. Grathol' s Reply Br. 
at 30-33. In making this argument, Grathol again makes numerous inaccurate statements and 
misrepresents the record. 
First, Grathol's own appraiser, Sherwood, testified, unequivocally, that the remaining 
property suffered "zero" severance damages. See R. 1265 at 1290 (Post-Trial Mem. Decision & 
Order for J ("There's zero severance, correct.")) and Tr. ofHrg. on Motion For Attorney Fees 
(Aug. 29, 2012) at 47 ("[Sherwood's] testimony that severance damages is zero was credible and 
certainly comported with what the other evidence was.") (brackets and emphasis added). 
In addition, the two other professional real estate appraisers who testified at trial, Stan 
Moe and Larry Pynes, both testified that the Grathol property suffered no severance damages. 
Thus, the District Court's finding of no severance damages was amply supported by the 
evidence, including the testimony of the only real estate appraiser called by Grathol. 
Grathol claims that Alan Johnson incorporated into his opinion of severance damages the 
approximately $1 million in additional utility costs alleged by Geoff Reeslund as being necessary 
to bring utilities to the western-most 0.4 acres of property that will be located on the other side of 
US-95 after the ITD Project. This claim is not correct and misrepresents the record. 
* Johnson never testified that he included Reeslund's alleged increased utility costs 
in his determination of severance damages. See Johnson trial testimony, Trial Tr., 
Vol. IV at 751-816. 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Johnson's determination of severance damages were significantly lower than 
$1 million (see R. Ex. J at 962-63 (Just Compensation)), which shows that there 
was absolutely no correlation between, or reliance upon, Reeslund's testimony 
about alleged utility costs and Johnson's testimony regarding severance damages. 
Grathol freely admits that it was not seeking discrete severance damages based on 
Reeslund's testimony about alleged increased utility costs. See Grathol's Reply 
Br. at 30. 
Johnson's alleged severance damages were not severance damages. The 
calculations he labeled as "severance damages" (see R. Ex. J at 962-63 (Just 
Compensation)), were repeatedly shown to be a claim for damages based on 
construction delay which is barred by law. See ITD's Opening Br. at 56 and 
citations therein. 
ITD had to file several motions to strike Johnson's claim for damages for 
construction delay. Every time, Grathol avoided the motion by simply changing 
the "name" of the damages calculated by Johnson. However, despite the name 
changes, the calculations and dollar amounts remained exactly the same as the 
unlawful construction delay claim every time. Id 
Johnson at no time testified that his so-called "severance damages" were based on 
a reduction in the fair market value of the remaining Grathol property, after the 
taking, due to increased utility costs or any other type of development costs. 
See Johnson trial testimony, Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 751-816. In other words, even 
Johnson did not believe that severance damages could or should be awarded based 
on Reeslund's testimony regarding utility costs. 
So, in addition to making false and misleading statements about Johnson's testimony, 
Grathol again improperly attempts to recover unlawful damages for construction delay. 
Grathol also misrepresents the testimony ofITD's witness, George Hedley. George 
Hedley and the engineering experts from David Evans and Associates, Inc., calculated the 
infrastructure and development costs for the mixed use, commercial/retail development planned 
by Grathol. Based on this work, Hedley testified that, both before and after the project, Grathol's 
proposed development was not financially feasible because in both scenarios it would cost more 
to develop the property than what Grathol paid for the land. Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 736:20-738:7. 
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In short, Hedley testified that it did not make any economic sense to develop the property in the 
manner proposed by Grathol. 
Most of Grathol' s argument on severance damages based on the testimony of Hedley 
focuses on the potential costs to develop the property after completion of the US-95 Project. 
Grathol' s Reply Br. at 32. Grathol' s argument takes Hedley' s testimony out of context and then 
improperly mischaracterizes it as a potential source of severance damage. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Hedley's testimony was not a before-and-after valuation of the property, nor did it 
represent any discussion or assessment of severance damages to the property. 
Hedley's testimony demonstrated that Grathol's proposed development was not 
economically feasible, and made no economic sense, because the costs to develop 
the property-both before the Project and after-were significantly higher than 
what Grathol paid for the property. 
It is improper to calculate severance damages based upon increased development 
costs, where there is no evidence that such costs resulted in a decrease in the 
property's value. C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 
P.3d 194,202 (2003); Idaho Code§ 7-711(2); IDJI2d 7-16.5; R. 734-37. 
No evidence was offered by any witness that the remaining property decreased in 
market value due to any alleged increase in development costs. 
Hedley's testimony was not that the actual development costs were greater 
because of the project. Rather, Hedley testified that the actual costs to develop 
the property as proposed by Grathol was "about a million dollars less because the 
right-of-way was not included." Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 736:6-10 (emphasis added). 
Grathol simply ignores this testimony. 
Although the estimated per-square-foot development costs were greater, the total 
development costs were less after the !TD Project. Id. 
Since Hedley did not testify to the fair market value of the property or any 
difference in the fair market value before or after the taking, his testimony cannot 
be used to justify an award of severance damages, particularly since he testified 
that Grathol's proposed commercial development was not financially or 
economically feasible either before or after the Project. 
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Again, Grathol misuses the misrepresented testimony of George Hedley to make an 
improper claim for severance damages. 
4. Grathol's Reply Brief Wrongfully Persists In Attempting To Recover 
Damages Based On Sylvan Road. Such Claims Have Been Repeatedly 
Dismissed And Grathol's Arguments Are False And Misrepresent The 
Record. 
Despite repeated dismissals by the District Court and by the Supreme Court, Grathol 
persists in attempting to recover damages based on Sylvan Road in its Reply Brief. Grathol's 
Reply Br. at 33-36. It claims the District Court should have allowed Alan Johnson to testify 
about the adverse impacts of Sylvan Road on Grathol's proposed development, so that Johnson 
could justify his opinion on "severance damages." Id. The fact that Grathol is barred by law 
from recovering compensation or damages based on Sylvan Road is addressed in detail in ITD's 
Opening Brief. Id. at 59-63. 
Grathol's persistence on this issue is astonishing and represents the willful refusal to 
abide by the rulings of the District Court and the Supreme Court. Grathol's actions further 
bolster ITD's claim to recover reasonable attorney fees in this case. 
Initially, Grathol claimed that ITD was condemning land for Sylvan Road and was 
planning to build Sylvan Road across Grathol's property, even though neither ITD's 
administrative order of condemnation nor ITD's complaint in this case sought any taking for 
Sylvan Road. Based on these facts, the District Court repeatedly held that ITD is not taking land 
for Sylvan Road and is not building Sylvan Road on the Grathol property. See Grathol I, ITD's 
Br. On Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38511-2011, at 8 and 32-35, and the record 
citations therein (filed Nov. 4, 2011). Grathol appealed the District Court's ruling, and the 
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Supreme Court denied the appeal, finding that ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. See 
Grathol I, 153 Idaho at 93,278 P.3d at 963. 
Nine months after the District Court's decision on ITD's Motion For Possession, Grathol 
submitted expert disclosures representing that Alan Johnson would testify to damages caused by 
the taking and construction of Sylvan Road. Therefore, despite the District Court's prior ruling 
and the Supreme Court decision affirming that ruling and barring this claim, ITD was forced to 
file a motion for summary judgment to dismiss any and all claims for compensation or damages 
based on Sylvan Road. See R. 308 at 311, 317-24 (ITD's Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.). 
After a hearing on ITD's motion on January 27, 2012 (a year after the first ruling on 
Sylvan Road), the District Court entered its order. R. 715-17 (Order Re: PL' s Mot. for Summ. J. 
(Feb. 3, 2012)). In that order, the Court held: "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a 
taking claim for Sylvan Road and damages for such alleged taking is granted, and this claim is 
hereby stricken." Id. at 716 (emphasis added). Thus, all claims for both an alleged taking and 
for damages based on Sylvan Road were dismissed on summary judgment. Grathol never 
appealed that decision. 
Moreover, Alan Johnson freely admitted that he did not intend to offer any testimony of 
alleged severance damages based on Sylvan Road. 
Q. Mr. Johnson, in your valuation do you have any discrete 
number of damages, amount of damages attributable to a 
future construction of Sylvan Road? 
A. I don't believe so, no. 
- 30 -
Q. And so that's not part of your testimony? 
A. No. 
Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 801:16-21. 
Johnson had not disclosed any testimony of severance damages based on Sylvan Road 
prior to trial, and had no testimony to offer as to an amount of severance damages at trial. Given 
that and the previous rulings dismissing claims for compensation and damages based on Sylvan 
Road, the District Court did not err, and certainly did not commit reversible error, by excluding 
vague, non-specific testimony about an alleged impact on a proposed future development plan, 
based on a road that may or may not be built, at some time in the future, by someone other than 
ITD. 
Further, if Sylvan Road is ever built, it will be Grathol's responsibility to build it to serve 
its commercial development and the multiple parcels and multiple commercial tenants within the 
development. See Grathol 1, ITD's Br. On Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38511-2011 at 
9-11, 3 9-40, and the Kootenai County Ordinances referenced therein and attached to the brief as 
App. A. (filed Nov. 4, 2011). All commercial developers in Idaho are responsible for building 
roads within commercial developments. Id. ( citing LC. § 50-1309). Grathol cannot seek public 
compensation for a road that Grathol needs for its own private development. 
Having failed, repeatedly, in its attempts to recover compensation and/or damages based 
on a taking for Sylvan Road, Grathol shifted its position, in response to ITD's motion for 
summary judgment, by claiming that Grathol would not have had to build Sylvan Road "but for" 
ITD's US-95 Project. Therefore, it argues, Grathol should still be compensated for impacts of 
Sylvan Road. This claim was simply incorrect and was rejected by the District Court in its ruling 
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dismissing the claim on ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 715 at 716 (Order Re: 
Pl.'s Mot. For Summ. J. (Feb. 3, 2012)). 
Grathol makes this same inaccurate and unfounded argument, yet again, in its Reply 
Brief. Grathol's Reply Br. at 34 ("ITD's project made the extension of a frontage road through 
Grathol's property, a foregone conclusion."). ITD should not have to keep re-litigating rulings 
that have already been made. Because it has had to do this and so many other unnecessary things 
in response to abuses and improper tactics by Grathol, ITD should be allowed to recover its 
reasonable attorney fees in this case. 
Grathol's same argument, previously rejected by the District Court and not appealed by 
Grathol, is false and unfounded for the following reasons: 
First,§ 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones 
· requires that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See R. 384 at 
401 (Affidavit of Mary York in Support of PlaintiffITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion in Limine, Ex. 2 at 2 (R. 401)). 
Section 10-3-l(B)(4)(e) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the 
services and infrastructure that the developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision) 
requires "[p ]ublicly-maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District." 
See id, at 407-08. Thus, every individual lot within the 56-acre "before" commercial 
development and the 40-acre "after" commercial development will have to have access from a 
public road. All of the lots on a 56-acre development in the before condition could not have had 
frontage on US-95, with dozens of individual driveway accesses a few feet apart on US-95. 
No site plan was ever produced by Grathol in discovery or at trial that showed how the 56-acre 
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property could be developed with commercial uses without any interior road(s). In addition, in 
its opposition to ITD's motion for summary judgment, Grathol did not offer any testimony or 
evidence that the property could be commercially developed in the before condition 
( disregarding the ITD Project altogether) without any interior public road. 
Section 10-3-l(D)(2) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances also makes clear that 
the developer will be required to dedicate the fully constructed roads within the development to 
the county or local highway district: "Except for gated communities and common driveways 
approved by the Board [of county commissioners], roads and associated rights-of-way shall be 
dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id at 410 (brackets and emphasis added). In 
addition, Idaho Code § 50-1309 also requires owners of new developments to "make a 
dedication of all public streets and rights-of-way shown on said plat." Grathol has repeatedly 
failed to respond to or even acknowledge the Kootenai County zoning ordinances cited above 
and the requirements ofldaho Code§ 50-1309. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, ITD submitted a report from engineers 
and land planners with David Evans and Associates ("DEA"). See R. 384 at 499-520 (Affidavit 
of Mary York in Support of PlaintiffITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in 
Limine, Ex. 11 (R. 499-520)). DEA reported that construction of interior roadways within the 
Grathol commercial development would be a requirement of commercial development approval 
in both the before condition (without the US-95 Project) and the after condition (with the US-95 
Project). Id. at 505. In other words, the interior road, whether called Sylvan Road or any other 
name, would be required regardless of the US-95 Project, and was not "caused" by the Project. 
The need for the interior road and the cause of the road is Grathol' s proposal to develop a large, 
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mixed-use commercial/retail development. The DEA report also states that interior roadways 
within the Grathol development would have to be dedicated to Lakes Highway District as a 
public roadway. Id. 
In its reply brief, Grathol objected to ITD's references to the DEA Report because it was 
not admitted at trial. However, it was made part of the record on summary judgment, without 
objection by Grathol. Therefore, ITD may certainly refer to the report on issues previously 
raised by the parties and decided by the District Court. 
It is undisputed that before the Project, Grathol sought to rezone its entire property to a 
commercial zone and that Kootenai County granted Grathol's application. Grathol I, R. 90 at 92 
(Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
(January 10, 2011)). During that process, and before the ITD condemnation, the Kootenai 
County hearing examiner cited correspondence from the Lakes Highway District Engineer, 
stating that "[t]he Developer should be required to provide all accesses to this development from 
either Howard Road or the future Highway District frontage road." See R. 384 at 537 (York Aff. 
in Supp. ofITD's Mtn. for Summ. J. and Mtn. in Limine (Grathol's Rezone Application, at ,r 
2.12, Exhibit PA-5, Letter, Ex. 16) (R. 537)). The "Highway District frontage road" is what 
Grathol has consistently referred to as Sylvan Road, and would be required by and dedicated to 
Lakes Highway District, not !TD. This evidence shows that public road access will be required 
and it will be Kootenai County and Lakes Highway District that will require it. This 
correspondence was sent well before the condemnation action by ITD, and was applied to the 
proposed development in the "before" condition-prior to the US-95 Project. 
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All of the above information, exhibits, and authority were presented to the District Court 
on ITD's motion for summary judgment. See R. 305 and 308-58 (ITD's Br. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. J.), at 321-22; and R. 648 at 661-64 (ITD's Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., and 
citations to the record and expert reports therein). 
For all of these reasons, Grathol's continued attempts to recover compensation and/or 
damages based on Sylvan Road constitute vexatious litigation, harassment, and abuse of the 
judicial process, and justifies an award of attorney fees to ITD. 
F. The District Court Erred In Applying Idaho Code§ 12-117, Rather Than 
TheAcarrequi Standards, To ITD's Motion For Attorney Fees And Its 
Ruling Therefore Must Be Reversed. 
The District Court found ITD to be the prevailing party in this action and awarded ITD 
its costs as a matter of right and a small portion of its discretionary costs. However, despite its 
finding that ITD was the prevailing party, the District Court incorrectly applied§ 12 ... 1 l ?and 
denied ITD's motion for attorney fees. The award of attorney fees is within the guided 
discretion of the trial court and will only be overturned upon a showing of abuse. Jardine, 130 
Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139 (citing Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877,673 P.2d at 1071). In this 
case, where the District Court failed to apply the Acarrequi standards to ITD's motion, its ruling 
on ITD's motion for attorney fees is properly reversed. 
G. The District Court Correctly Applied TheAcarrequi Guidelines In Its Award 
Of Costs As A Matter Of Right And Discretionary Costs To ITD. 
Grathol argues that the District Court erred in its application of the Acarrequi guidelines, 
rather than the provisions of§ 12-11 7, in its award of costs to ITD. As with Grathol' s arguments 
regarding attorney fees, its position relating to cost awards in condemnation actions is similarly 
incorrect. Because Grathol's argument regarding the award of costs in this case is part of 
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Grathol' s appeal and not part of ITD' s cross-appeal, ITD does not address the issue of costs in 
this brief and instead relies upon the arguments contained in its brief in response to Grathol' s 
appeal, which details the appropriate standards for cost awards in condemnation cases under 
Acarrequi, Talbot, and Jardine. ITD's Opening Br. at 79-82. 
III. ITO REQUESTS THAT IT BE GRANTED ITS ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
ITD respectfully requests that the Court award ITD its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
ITD is the prevailing party in this matter and therefore is properly entitled to its attorney fees and 
costs under Idaho Code§ 12-121 andAcarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72 and 
its progeny. ITD made an offer of settlement that was at least 90 percent of the verdict in this 
case; ITD's settlement offer of $1.1 million was timely; Grathol did not voluntarily grant 
possession of the property; and its opposition to ITD's possession of the property had no 
legitimate basis or grounds. As discussed above, ITD is entitled to an award of its costs and 
attorney fees under Acarrequi, and particularly so in the present case due to the extreme and 
abusive conduct by Grathol throughout this case. ITD has set forth in detail the abuses and 
improper litigation tactics exercised by Grathol. See Section XII.E of ITD's Opening Br. and 
Section II.F above. Grathol has continued its pattern of abuse and improper conduct in this 
appeal including, unbelievably, once again seeking to recover compensation or damages based 
on Sylvan Road. 
In the alternative, ITD requests an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121. Grathol has pursued this appeal unreasonably and without 
foundation or support in law. Grathol's appeal is based solely on its disagreement with the 
District Court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses on the issues of 
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the larger parcel, severance damages, and Sylvan Road, which is not a proper basis for an appeal. 
Moreover, Grathol made no proper or meaningful attempt to establish any errors of law by the 
District Court. And finally, although Grathol implies otherwise, the District Court did not bar 
any of Grathol' s witnesses from testifying on any subject or issue, except claims for 
compensation or damages based on Sylvan Road, which were dismissed multiple times before 
trial. 
Based on the foregoing, ITD should be awarded its attorney fees and costs as the 
prevailing party in this case, and its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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